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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

*

Plaintiff-Petitioner, :
v.

:

JACKY BOBO,

:

Case No. 890606-CA

Priority No.

2

Defendant-Respondent. :
PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The sole issue presented in this petition for rehearing
is whether the Court applied an incorrect standard of review.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After being charged with several counts of drug crimes,
defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony (R.
29).
The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent
sentences of one to fifteen years and zero to five years at the
Utah State Prison.

However, the prison sentence was stayed and

defendant was placed on probation with the requirement that he
serve six months in the Davis County Jail.

The court also

ordered defendant to pay a fine of $2,000 and an additional 25%
surcharge for the Victim's Reparation Fund (R. 44, 46).

Defendant appealed his convictions.

This Court

affirmed in an opinion filed on December 12, 1990.

State v.

Bobo, No. 890606-CA (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 12, 1990) (a copy of the
opinion is contained in the addendum).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case are accurately set forth in the
Court's opinion.

Bobo, slip op. at 1-2.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In affirming the trial court's ruling that defendant
had voluntarily consented to the search of his home, this Court
articulated and applied a standard of review that is contrary to
decisions of this Court and the United States Supreme Court.

The

Court mischaracterized the issue of voluntary consent as a mixed
question of fact and law which is subject to the following
standard of review:

the trial court's factual findings

underlying its determination that the defendant voluntarily
consented to a search will not be disturbed unless they are
clearly erroneous; however, "the legal conclusion of voluntary
consent premised upon those facts is examined for correctness."
Bobo, slip op. at 4.

This is contrary to the established view

that the issue of whether a defendant voluntarily consented to a
search is a question of fact, and the trial court's determination
on that issue will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the Court should modify its opinion to set
forth the correct standard of review.

This will avoid needless

confusion on that matter in future appeals to this Court.

INTRODUCTION
A petition for rehearing is appropriate when the Court
has applied an incorrect principle of law in reaching its
decision.

See Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P.

619, 624 (1913).

The argument portion of this brief will

demonstrate that the State's petition for rehearing is properly
before the Court and should be granted.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT STANDARD OF
REVIEW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
THAT DEFENDANT HAD VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO
THE SEARCH OF HIS HOME; THEREFORE, THIS COURT
SHOULD MODIFY ITS OPINION TO SET FORTH THE
CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW.
In its opinion, the Court affirmed the trial court's
ruling that defendant had voluntarily consented to the search of
his home.

However, in doing so, the Court articulated and

applied an incorrect standard of review.
The Court set forth the following standard of review:
We review the findings of fact supporting
a trial court's decision on a motion to
suppress under a clearly erroneous standard.
The trial court's factual determinations are
clearly erroneous only if in conflict with
the clear weight of the evidence, or if this
court has a "definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made."
While we accord considerable deference to
factual findings since the trial court is in
the best position to evaluate witness
credibility and the like, we examine the
conclusions of law arising from those
findings under a correction-of-error standard
according no particular deference to the
trial court. Therefore, the factual findings
leading to the trial court's determination
that defendant voluntarily consented to the
search of his home are considered for clear
error and the legal conclusion of voluntary

consent premised upon those facts is examined
for correctness.
Bobo, slip op. at 3-4 (citations omitted).

Here, the Court

mischaracterized the issue of voluntary consent to search as a
mixed question of fact and law.

This is contrary to decisions of

this Court and the United States Supreme Court.
In State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
this Court correctly set forth the standard of review applicable
to the trial court's determination on the issue of voluntary
consent to search.

There, it stated:

A warrantless search conducted pursuant to a
consent that is voluntary in fact does not
violate the fourth amendment. Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041,
2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). . . .
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557,
100 S.Ct. at 1878; United States v. Carson,
793 F.2d 1141, 1149 (10th Cir. 1986). We
deferentially review a trial court's finding
of voluntary consent, like other factual
determinations underlying the denial of a
motion to suppress, disturbing it only if the
appellant demonstrates that there has been
clear error. United States v. Miller, 589
F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59
L.Ed.2d 771 (1979); State v. Ashe# 745 P.2d
1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).
790 P.2d at 82 (emphasis added).

See also Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d
431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Thus, it is well settled law that

the issue of voluntary consent to search is purely a question of
fact, and the trial court's determination on that issue is
therefore subject to only the highly deferential "clearly
erroneous" standard of review.

Accordingly, the Court should modify its opinion to set
forth the correct standard of review recognized in Webb.

This

will avoid confusion as to what the correct standard of review is
in future appeals decided by the Court,
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing argument, the Court should grant
rehearing and modify its opinion to set forth the correct
standard of review.

Rule 35(c), Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure.
RESPECTFULLY

submitted this //

day of December,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
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Assistant Attorney General
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Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree
felony, and unlawful possession of controlled substances
without tax stamps affixed, a third degree felony. Defendant's
conviction was affirmed by this court in State v. Bobo, 131
Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam), on the
ground the claimed conditional nature of defendant's guilty
plea was not shown in the record. Xfl. at 25. See State v.
Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). That opinion was
withdrawn and the matter recalendared when the conditional
nature of defendant's guilty plea was demonstrated in
conjunction with a petition for rehearing. At this juncture,
defendant principally challenges the denial of a motion to
suppress and, in response to the state's position, reasserts
the conditional nature of his guilty plea. We affirm.
FACTS
On December 6, 1988, two officers from the Layton City
Police Department responded to a private security guard's

report of a loud party involving juveniles, drugs, and alcohol
at defendant's home. Upon arrival, officers heard the familiar
sounds of a loud party in progress and knocked on defendant's
door. After the officers explained the purpose of their visit,
defendant invited the officers in to verify that there were no
juveniles present. Once inside, the officers lost interest in
the age of the attendees when they saw a pipe in plain view on
a counter, which, upon closer examination, smelled of
marijuana. Defendant was placed under arrest. When he was
searched incident to the arrest, a small vial containing a
white substance was found. Defendant was handcuffed and
detained in his living room. The arresting officers asked
defendant to consent to a search of his home. Defendant did
not respond to this request.
Narcotics detectives were summoned to defendant's home.
The officers also telephoned a deputy county attorney to
request that a search warrant for defendant's home be secured.
When the narcotics detectives arrived, one of them repeated the
request for consent to search the home. The detective told
defendant that a warrant was being prepared. Defendant told
the detective that he had not said they could not search, he
had simply not said they could search. The detective repeated
his request, telling the defendant that his consent would
expedite the process. Defendant then told the detective that
he wished to get it over with, and that the officers could
search. Defendant was handcuffed throughout the period in
which these requests were repeated.
Immediately after voicing his consent to the search,
defendant told the officers there were two bags of marijuana in
the refrigerator. Officers also found cocaine and psilocybin
mushrooms in an unlocked safe in the bedroom. At trial,
defendant moved to suppress admission of the evidence located
in the search of his home, challenging the voluntariness of his
consent. The trial court concluded that consent had been
freely given and denied the motion to suppress.
CONDITIONAL GUILTY PLEA
In State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), this court recognized the validity of conditional guilty
pleas. Under a conditional guilty or no-contest plea, the
defendant preserves the right to challenge particular issues on
appeal and to then withdraw the plea in the event the appeal is
successful. 1$. at 938-40. The state persists in asserting
1. It is unclear from the record how many separate requests
were made, although it may have been as many as five by various
officers over a period of 30-40 minutes.

that defendant did not enter a conditional plea and is now
precluded from appealing the trial court's denial of his motion
to suppress evidence.
When this court was originally asked to consider
defendant's appeal, the record did not reflect that defendant's
guilty plea was entered consistent with Sery. Although the
trial court had issued a certificate of probable cause, the
record contained no direct indication that defendant's guilty
plea was conditional. State v. Bobo, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 25
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam). A defendant seeking
appellate review pursuant to a conditional plea bears the
burden of demonstrating that the conditional nature of the plea
is unambiguously established in the trial court record. See
Bobo, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25 (withdrawn on other grounds),
fiftfi also Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 787 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) (burden on parties to create adequate record to
preserve issues for appeal). Defendant must show that the
prosecutor consented to the conditional plea and that the trial
judge approved the plea. Sery, 758 P.2d at 939.
On petition for rehearing, defendant presented this court
with an affidavit of the trial judge, in which he unqualifiedly
stated that defendant's plea was conditional and that the
suppression issue was preserved for appeal. While such should
be made to appear of record, defendant cannot be deprived of
the benefit of his plea bargain due to an oversight of this
nature. The oversight was expeditiously and unambiguously
corrected to our satisfaction with the judge's affidavit. The
plea was clearly conditional and we will turn to the merits of
the issue preserved for appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the findings of fact2 supporting a trial
court's decision on a motion to suppress under a clearly
erroneous standard. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied. No. 900238 (Utah, Oct. 23, 1990);

State v, Sierra, 754 p.2d 972, 974 (Utah ct. App. 1988).

Ss&

also State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). The trial
court's factual determinations are clearly erroneous only if in
2. The trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress evidence must be supported by detailed factual
findings. State v. Loveqren, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10-11 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882 n.l.

conflict with the clear weight of the evidence, Marshall, 791
P.2d at 882, or if this court has a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made." Walker, 743 P.2d at
193. £££ State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
While we accord considerable deference to factual
findings since the trial court is in the best position to
evaluate witness credibility and the like, we examine the
conclusions of law arising from those findings under a
correction-of-error standard according no particular deference
to the trial court. State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-55
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 796 P.2d 684
(Utah 1990). Therefore, the factual findings leading to the
trial court's determination that defendant voluntarily
consented to the search of his home are considered for clear
error and the legal conclusion of voluntary consent premised
upon those facts is examined for correctness. See Oates v.
Chavez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988).
CONSENT TO SEARCH
A. State Constitution
Defendant asks us to examine his consent under Article I,
section 14, of the Utah Constitution, and argues we should
adopt a rule which would require law enforcement officers to
inform persons, of whom they request consent to search, of the
right to refuse consent. Counsel for defendant vigorously
argued before this court that rights granted under the Fourth
Amendment and its Utah counterpart ought to stand in equal
respect to those granted under the Fifth Amendment, and,
therefore, that a Miranda-type warning should be required under
the state constitutional provision paralleling the Fourth
Amendment.
Under the prevailing view, such an explanation is

3. Defendant suggests that like the Miranda warnings which
must precede custodial interrogation, persons asked to consent
to a search should be advised along these lines: You have the
right to refuse permission for any search. If you withhold
consent, we would be required to request a search warrant from
a judge, which warrant would only issue if we could show the
judge probable cause to believe [the item sought] will be
found. If you consent to the search, any incriminating
evidence found can and will be used against you.

but one factor in determining the voluntariness of consent.
Sfi£, e.g., Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 517 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citing cases). S££ Alfifl Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 248 (1973) (determinative factors include "lack of any
effective warnings to a person of his rights'1).
While we welcome argument of the general sort advanced by
defendant, we decline to adopt the rule urged by defendant in
this case. Defendant's brief and arguments reflect little more
than the "nominal allusion" to state constitutional rights
condemned in State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah Ct. App.
1989). Until such time as attorneys heed the call of the
appellate courts of this state to more fully brief and argue
the applicability of the state constitution, see, e.g., State
v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986) ("[i]t is imperative
that Utah lawyers brief [Utah courts] on relevant state
constitutional questions"); Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328, we cannot
meaningfully play our part in the judicial laboratory of
autonomous state constitutional law development.
See Brennan,
4. Utah attorneys are by no means unique in their struggle to
heed the call nor are Utah courts alone in their insistence
that state constitutional issues be meaningfully briefed. See,
e.g., State v. Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466, 755 P.2d 797, 800-01
(1988).
5. While the cases cited in the text and many others have made
the general call, we are mindful of the concern of some
attorneys that we have not been entirely clear about what we
are looking for. It may be helpful to note that in most cases
where an argument is made for an innovative interpretation of a
state constitutional provision textually similar to a federal
provision, the following points should be developed and
supported with authority and analysis.
First, counsel should offer analysis of the unique context
in which Utah's constitution developed, which is particularly
germane in the search and seizure context. See, e.g., Bradley,
Hide and Seek: Children on the Underground, 51 Utah Hist. Q.
133, 142 (1983); Crawley, The Constitution of the State of
D££fi£££, 29 B.Y.U. Studies 7 (1989); Flynn, Federalism and
Viable State Government—The History of Utah's Constitution,
1966 Utah L. Rev. 311.
Second, counsel should demonstrate that state appellate
courts regularly interpret even textually similar state
constitutional provisions in a manner different from federal
interpretations of the United States Constitution and that it
is entirely proper to do so in our federal system. See, e.g.,

The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 535, 549 (1986) (noting that the state courts* role as
laboratories for development of individual rights was being
revived). Moreover, the proper forum in which to commence
thoughtful and probing analysis of state constitutional
interpretation is before the trial court, not, as typically
(Footnote 5 continued)
State v. Hyoh, 711 P.2d 264, 272-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring); State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981).
SSR also State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988)
("choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for
insulating the state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by
the federal courts"). &&£ generally People v. Brisendine, 13
Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329
(1975) ("It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in
state constitutions textually identical to the Bill of Rights
were intended to mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson
of history is otherwise: the Bill of Rights was based upon
corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions,
rather than the reverse."); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520
P.2d 51 (1974); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66
(1975).
Third, citation should be made to authority from other
states supporting the particular construction urged by
counsel. S££ State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233, 237
(1985) (describing the "sibling state" approach). Particular
attention should be given to those states whose constitutions
served as models for the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., M.
Hickman, Utah ConstitutJPnal Law 42-43 (1954) (referring to the
Illinois Constitution).
We refer counsel to the insightful primer on state
constitutional advocacy found in State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221,
500 A.2d 233 (1985), cited with approval in State v. Earl, 716
P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). Sfi£ iLSfi State v. Hunt, 91 N.J.
338, 450 A.2d 952 (Handler, J., concurring).

happens and as happened here, for the first time on appeal.
Johnson, 771 P.2d at 327-28. We therefore consider the
voluntariness of defendant's consent to search his apartment
solely under the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution.
B. Federal Constitution
Voluntariness of consent must be decided after
consideration of the totality of the circumstances. State v.
Whiti£nlia£k, 621 P. 2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). The Utah Supreme
Court has offered certain factors to guide the determination of
voluntariness of consent under the Fourth Amendment,
including: "1) the absence of a claim of authority to search
by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by
the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by
the owner . . . and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the
part of the officer." l$i. In ruling on the motion to suppress,
the trial court in this case entered specific findings
including that Mno force [was] exhibited and no threats were
made to the defendant . . . .
The defendant was cooperative.
No tricks were employed by the law enforcement officers, when
they said they were getting a warrant they were in the process
of getting a warrant [through the efforts of] the county
attorney." Viewing the trial court's factual findings under a
"clearly erroneous" standard, we conclude that the court's
findings are supported by substantial evidence and that they
are not otherwise clearly erroneous. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 882.
Defendant nonetheless claims the trial court erred in its
legal conclusion that defendant's consent was voluntary,
arguing that the officers' statements to the effect that the
county attorney was preparing a warrant, and the repeated
requests for consent while defendant was handcuffed and in
custody, were coercive, thus precluding a conclusion of
voluntary consent. We disagree.
Consent given while in custody does not, per se, render
the consent involuntary. United States v. Janik. 723 F.2d 537,
548 (7th Cir. 1983). The fact that defendant was immediately
handcuffed upon arrest and remained handcuffed similarly does
not defeat a conclusion of voluntariness.^ It is but a single

6. Defendant claims the repeated requests for consent, see
note 1, supra, during a time when he was handcuffed, instilled
a coercive atmosphere precluding voluntariness. We have

element for the trial court to consider. People v. Ratliffr 41
Cal. 3d 675, 715 P.2d 665, 671, 224 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1986)
(handcuffing does not demonstrate that consent is involuntary);
United States v. Kon Yu-Leuna, 910 F.2d 33, 41 (2nd Cir. 1990)
(finding of coercion does not follow from handcuffing); Janik,
723 F.2d at 548. We note that even though defendant was under
arrest and in custody, he was in the relative security and
comfort of his own home*
Assuming the officers' tone and tenor implied that a
warrant would ultimately be issued and result in a search of
defendant's apartment, we disagree with defendant's assertion
(Footnote 6 continued)
examined the record and find no suggestion that the requests
were not neutrally made; nothing in the record suggests that
the officers were menacing or threatening in their requests.
While repeated requests which escalate intofifimajQ&s.a r e
inherently more coercive and demand keen scrutiny, repeated
neutral requests, by their very nature, may well tend to send
the message that a person has the right to refuse consent: Why
else would the officers keep asking? On the other hand, the
incessant reiteration of even neutrally phrased requests may
tend to suggest the officers have not gotten the "right" answer
yet from a suspect and that their requests will continue until
the suspect gives the response they seek.
Although the factual mix in each case will vary,
ordinarily the mere number of requests will be much less
relevant than the surrounding circumstances and the way in
which the requests are phrased and spoken.
7. Notably, the officers did not tell defendant that the
warrant would inevitably issue, merely that it was being
sought. The implication stemmed, if at all, from the officer's
indication to defendant that the process would be expedited if
he consented. This was surely accurate. Absent defendant's
consent, the process of searching his apartment would not even
begin until the warrant application was completed; one of the
officers signed the affidavit which would accompany the
application; the county attorney presented the application to a
magistrate; the magistrate reviewed it and issued the warrant;
and the warrant was then taken to defendant's home. But even
if the implication fairly to be drawn went beyond merely the
subject of timing to suggest that issuance of the warrant was

that the implication vitiated the voluntary nature of his
consent. The trial court found that the officers had in fact
telephoned a deputy county attorney, who was in the process of
preparing a warrant application. A truthful declaration of the
alternative course of action the officers were simultaneously
taking does not amount to coercion. Kon Yu-Leuna, 910 F.2d at
41; United States v. Lace, 669 F.2d 46, 52 (2nd Cir.), certdenied, 459 U.S. 854 (1982); Ratliff, 715 P.2d at 671. The
trial court found that the officers honestly represented their
efforts—they were actively seeking a search warrant at the
time they claimed to be.
The trial court considered the factors suggested in
Whittenback and resolved four of the five factors in favor of
voluntariness. The trial court then applied the totality of
the circumstances test and determined that consent was freely
given. We see no error in the court's legal conclusion of
voluntary consent in view of its findings of fact, which enjoy
adequate evidentiary support.
CONCLUSION
Defendant properly preserved his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress evidence by entering a
conditional plea before the trial court. Defendant has failed
to convince us that his consent to search his home was not
freely and voluntarily given. Defendant's conviction is
accordingly affirmed.

Gregor^fT. Orme, Judge

(Footnote 7 continued)
inevitable, the implication was not misleading. Given an
accurate and complete account of the evening's events, no
magistrate would have had difficulty concluding there was
probable cause to believe other drugs would be found in the
home, namely the marijuana some of which had recently found its
way into the pipe the officers found in plain view. Of course,
any indication by officers that issuance of a warrant was
inevitable would vitiate an ensuing consent if probable cause
was anything less than iron-clad. Thus, officers would be
well-advised to refrain from any commentary, direct or by
implication, on the likelihood a warrant would actually issue.

WE CONCUR:
^

^?

'/
i^Otx^^-ft^^cj

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Normal H. Jackson,*3udge
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